In the current Internet, there is no clean way for affected parties to react to poor forwarding performance: when a domain violates its Service Level Agreement (SLA) with a contractual partner, the partner must resort to ad-hoc probing-based monitoring to determine the existence and extent of the violation. Instead, we propose a new, systematic approach to the problem of forwarding-performance verification. Our mechanism relies on voluntary reporting, allowing each domain to disclose its loss and delay performance to its customers and peers. Most importantly, it enables verifiable performance measurements, i.e., domains cannot abuse it to significantly exaggerate their performance. Finally, our mechanism is tunable, allowing each participating domain to determine how many resources to devote to it independently (i.e., without any inter-domain coordination), exposing a controllable tradeoff between performance-verification quality and resource consumption. Our mechanism comes at the cost of deploying modest functionality at the participating domains' border routers; we show that it requires reasonable resources, well within modern network capabilities.
Introduction
The lack of a systematic method for estimating the performance of Internet service providers (ISPs) is a well known problem: when an ISP does not perform as expected, there is no clean way for the affected parties to detect the problem so they can debug it, ask for compensation if a Service-Level Agreement (SLA) has been violated, or simply learn from it (e.g., re-assess a peering agreement with an under-performing neighbor). This lack of information makes network debugging difficult and slow, even leading ISPs to deny their failures to their customers and peers, pointing fingers at one another. One could attribute this situation to the best-effort nature of the Internet which, by definition, provides no a-priori guarantees. Yet that is no reason not to expect useful, after-the-fact information about ISP performance-actually, it makes perfect sense to expect such information in a best-effort environment like the Internet, where communication quality often relies on quick failure detection and on choosing the right providers and peers.
Since ISPs offer no explicit interface for their customers and peers to verify their performance, the latter can only resort to probing tools like traceroute or other active measurements. Moreover, researchers have recently started to combine probing from multiple vantage points (e.g., PlanetLab nodes) to gain information about ISP performance that would not be accessible through simple probing [14, 13] . This information is typically extracted from channels with a different purpose (e.g., ICMP traffic), because probing mechanisms are designed under the assumption that ISPs would never freely provide honest information about their performance.
But what if ISPs were willing to export an explicit interface through which their performance can be queried? In this work, we ask the question, how should we design such an interface such that it provides accurate and verifiable information, while it can be implemented using a reasonable, tunable amount of resources? On the one hand, we find this to be an interesting thought experiment. On the other hand, we identify two strong, albeit perhaps unintuitive, reasons why an ISP may willingly expose its performance problems to the outside world.
First, ISPs often need to exchange performance information anyway with their customers and peers, in order to handle customer complaints. When a customer calls her ISP to complain that she cannot reach a certain destination, the ISP needs to know whether the problem lies in its own local network, the customer's network, the network of the peer that is handling traffic to that destination, or the destination's network-because each of these cases warrants a different response. Today, this information is acquired by ISP operators in a reactive, ad-hoc manner, which means that it takes time to resolve each complaint, potentially leaving customers dissatisfied. It makes sense that an ISP would prefer to collaborate with its customers and peers and willingly exchange troubleshooting reports with them, provided that it can trust these reports to be accurate and honest.
Second, it makes sense that an ISP would prefer to report its own performance rather than have its performance evaluated by untrusted entities, through potentially inaccurate mechanisms. Probing or other edge-based "black-box" mechanisms typically run on coalitions of end-systems like PlanetLab; the ISP has no reason to trust these, and they can provide no guarantee for the accuracy of their measurements. If an ISP's performance is to be talked about anyway, an accurate, trusted self-reporting mechanism may be preferable to the ISP, because, at least, it provides the ISP with control over the quality and quantity of the information that is revealed about its business.
Self-reporting is not necessarily better or worse than edge-based probing; each approach has different pros and cons. On the one hand, while probing is effective for localizing persistent outages or high-rate drop patterns, it provides no reliable indicator of the fate of non-probe traffic: probes can be treated differently, either by design (e.g., ICMP packet responses are generated off the fast path of routers), or by "strategic thinking" (treating probe packets preferentially to improve externally perceived performance). On the other hand, whereas probing is simple and requires no changes in ISPs, a self-reporting mechanism by necessity requires some extra complexity in the control-and data-plane mechanisms of the Internet's forwarding fabric.
In the rest of the paper, we describe a self-reporting mechanism for verifiable network-performance measurements (or VPM, for brevity). According to VPM, each ISP's loss and delay performance is cooperatively estimated by the ISP itself and the other network domains (customers and peers) that carry its traffic. Its key features are: (1) It enables accurate estimation of ISP performance, without revealing any information about the internal structure or routing policies of ISPs beyond what is already publicly available through BGP routing tables. (2) ISPs cannot abuse it to significantly exaggerate their performance. ( 3) It allows each ISP to choose its own cost/quality trade-off independently from others, yet in a way that does not compromise the verifiability of the derived measurements. These features come at the cost of deploying new functionality at the participating domains' border routers, but we show that the corresponding memory, processing, and bandwidth requirements are well within the capabilities of modern networks.
We start, in Section 2, with a high-level description of our approach, followed by a more precise problem statement and our assumptions. Section 3 explains why existing protocols or straightforward combinations of existing techniques fail to provide an appropriate solution. Section 4 describes what kind of information VPM collects and disseminates among participating domains. Sections 5 and 6 describe how VPM provides independent tunability of resource expenditure at different domains while still achieving high quality of information. Section 7 evaluates VPM experimentally and through backof-the-envelope calculations, in terms of its overhead and information quality provided. Section 8 discusses partial deployment and related work, and Section 9 concludes.
Setup
In this section, we first describe our approach at a high level ( §2.1), then provide a more concrete problem statement ( §2.2) and state our assumptions ( §2.3).
We will use the following terminology. A "domain" is a contiguous network that falls under one administra- tive entity; in the current Internet, a domain would refer to an edge network or a single Autonomous System (AS). Each domain has hand-off points (or HOP s) along its perimeter; these are ingress/egress points, where traffic enters/exits the domain's jurisdiction (see Figure 1 for examples). Each HOP is connected to a neighboring domain's HOP through an inter-domain link; such a link is considered faulty when it introduces loss or delay beyond a known specification. We are in particular interested in packets traversing the same HOP path, i.e., the same sequence of HOPs; we name such paths according to their source and destination routing prefixes (that is, origin prefixes as advertised in BGP).
Approach
In VPM, each domain monitors traffic at its HOPs and produces receipts for the traffic that enters and exits its network. For privacy reasons, a receipt is made available only to the domains that observed the corresponding traffic. For instance, if any of the domains in Figure 1 produces a receipt for a set of packets {p 1 , p 2 , ...} that crossed domains S, L, X, N , and D, the receipt is made available only to these particular 5 domains. To ensure this, each HOP classifies observed traffic per HOP path and produces a common receipt only for packets that followed the same HOP path. This implies that when a HOP observes two packets p 1 and p 2 , the HOP knows (in practice, can guess with a high probability) whether the two packets belong to the same HOP path (see Assumption #1 below). Each domain X collects receipts from its neighbors with the purpose of estimating each neighbor's loss and delay performance with respect to its traffic. Moreover, domain X collects receipts from the other domains that observed its traffic with the purpose of verifying the correctness of its neighbors' receipts. The idea is that if a neighbor provides incorrect receipts to exaggerate its own performance (e.g., claim that it delivered traffic that it actually dropped), these "dishonest" receipts will be inconsistent with the receipts of the other domains on the path.
We do not worry, in this paper, about how or when receipts are disseminated (see Assumption #2 below). A domain could request receipts periodically (e.g., once an hour or once a day) or arrange to receive them in real time, as they are generated. Collecting receipts from all other domains that handle a domain's traffic may sound like overkill at first-and it would be, if receipts were produced per packet or per flow. However, in VPM, receipts are produced at coarser granularity, such that each domain incurs, due to receipts, less than 0.1% overhead over the traffic it observes ( §7).
Instead, we focus on the content of the receipts. We ask the question, if domains were willing to provide receipts on the traffic they receive and deliver, what should these receipts consist of, such that (i) they can be generated using a reasonable, tunable amount of resources and (ii) neighbors can use them to estimate and verify each other's performance?
Threat Model We assume the existence of both honest domains that construct their receipts exactly as our protocol specifies and lying domains that construct their receipts using incomplete or fabricated information. Our threat model allows lying domains to collude with others towards a common nefarious goal. Nevertheless, a lying domain can observe only network traffic that appears locally (because it originates at, terminates at, or transits that domain), or that has been observed by its colluding domains.
We do not consider, in this paper, the scenario where domains modify observed traffic. This is not because this scenario is not plausible or not interesting, but because it is, to the best of our knowledge, further from current ISP practices (than introducing loss or unpredictable delay and denying performance problems). Moreover, as we will see, dealing with loss and delay without considering traffic modification is already a challenging enough problem to warrant separate treatment.
Problem Statement
Consider a path P, like the one pictured in Figure 1 . Suppose that each HOP in P can disseminate a certain amount of information to all other HOPs in P. The question is, what should this information be, such that the following conditions are met:
1. Computability As long as domain X in path P produces honest information, X's neighbors in P can use that information to compute the loss and delay introduced by X in the traffic flowing along P.
Regarding delay, we are interested in delay quantiles, e.g., domain L should be able to determine that domain X introduced delay below 5msec to 90% of the traffic with a certain (high) probability π. We are interested in quantiles, not delay averages, because a domain may exhibit low average delay at the time scale of seconds or minutes, yet introduce "spikes" of high delay that can impact the performance of TCP or real-time applications significantly [17] .
Verifiability
If domain X in path P produces dishonest information, its neighbors in P can detect and discard that information.
Tunability
The amount of resources consumed in collecting and disseminating information is locally tunable by each HOP, such that the accuracy of the statistics computed from this information degrades gracefully with the amount of resources spent to collect and disseminate it.
Assumptions
In addition to our threat model, we make the following assumptions:
(1) Our strongest assumption is that the HOP path over which traffic between the same source and destination origin prefix is routed changes only slowly (i.e., on the order of hours, rather than seconds). This is largely the case today for domain-level paths over short time scales. Note that this does not restrict how a domain load-balances traffic internally. Each domain is free to split traffic through multiple internal paths in any way it wants, as long as it forwards all traffic with the same source/destination prefixes via the same egress link.
(2) We assume that there exists a way for a domain in path P to disseminate receipts to all other domains in P, such that the authenticity and integrity of each received receipt is guaranteed. One way of realizing this assumption would be for each domain to make its receipts available at an administrative web-site and accessible over HTTPS. It is possible to design more efficient dissemination mechanisms, but that is outside the scope of this paper.
(3) Finally, we assume that each domain has some network equipment (routers or other middleboxes) that can perform at wire speed simple per-packet operations. Those include packet timestamp generation, arithmetic calculations or digest computations on packet headers and a small portion of packet payload, and modification of local state in a buffer. This assumption is well justified by current trends in production routers, as well as the increasing focus of academia and industry on programmable routers and switches [18, 7] .
Why a New Protocol
There already exist many good techniques for measuring network performance [8, 20, 12, 15] . So, instead of describing VPM from scratch, we first build, in this section, "obvious" solutions by combining or extending existing techniques, and describe why each of these solutions fails to meet the three conditions of our problem statement. We close with an overview of VPM and how it relates to the existing techniques.
Strawman
As a first-cut, strawman solution, we consider the following modest extension to the Packet Obituaries protocol [3] : Each HOP produces a receipt for every single packet it observes. A receipt consists of a digest for the corresponding packet and the timestamp for when the packet was observed. Each receipt is made available to all the domains that observed the packet.
Computability
The strawman easily meets this condition, as a receipt collector in possession of all the (honest) receipts generated by a domain X can determine whether each packet that entered X was dropped within X and, if not, by how much it was delayed within X. By combining such information for multiple packets, the receipt collector can easily compute aggregate loss statistics and delay quantiles for X.
Verifiability
The strawman also meets this condition:
To hide a loss or delay incident, a domain has to falsely put the blame for the incident on one of its neighbors, which results in inconsistent claims between the two domains. For instance, suppose domain X receives packet p from domain L but drops it before delivering it no domain N . If X is dishonest and wants to hide the fact that it dropped p, it can put the blame on N , i.e., falsely claim having delivered p to N . This claim will be inconsistent with N 's claim of not having received p.
Such an inconsistency can be due either to a lie or to a faulty inter-domain link. If a receipt collector receives inconsistent claims from two neighbors, it discards the corresponding receipts (from both neighbors) and notifies both of them of the inconsistency. The two involved neighbors can then debug their inter-domain link; if it is functioning correctly, then the inconsistency was due to a lie, and the lying domain is exposed to the neighbor it implicated. For instance, if X falsely reports having delivered packet p to N , but N correctly reports not having received p, the rest of the world cannot determine whether X or N is lying, but N does know that X is the liar.
A domain can always support a lying neighbor's claims, but then it either has to take itself the blame for the liar's loss/delay or falsely accuse another domain down the path. For instance, if X falsely claims having delivered p to N , N has the option of covering X's lie (by claiming that it indeed received p), but then it has to claim either that it lost p itself, or that it delivered p to D-in which case N is exposed to D as a liar.
It is important to note that the strawman meets the ver- Tunability This is where the strawman fails. The cost of maintaining and propagating per-packet receipts, though not intractable, can be expensive in buffering space, processing, and reporting bandwidth. Different domains may have different resources they are willing to devote to a self-reporting endeavor, and keeping per-packet state leaves no room for tuning.
Trajectory Sampling ++
Since the main problem with the strawman is the nontunable cost of collecting and exchanging per-packet state, the first solution that comes to mind is to sample, i.e., collect information not on all packets, but on a representative subset, and use it to infer statistics for the rest. Hence, we next consider a combination of the strawman and Trajectory Sampling [8] (we call it "Trajectory Sampling ++"). Each HOP applies a uniform hash function to a small, fixed portion of each observed packet. If the outcome exceeds a pre-configured threshold, then the packet is sampled and the HOP produces a receipt for it. Each pair of HOPs from the same domain use the same hash function and sampling threshold, hence sample the same packets. Each receipt is made available to all the domains that observed the corresponding packet.
Computability This condition is met, both for loss and delay statistics. First, a receipt collector in possession of all the (honest) receipts produced by a domain X can count how many of the sampled packets were lost within X; from that, it can estimate how many packets were lost within X overall, as shown in [20] . Similarly, the receipt collector can compute the delay incurred by each sampled packet within X, then estimate delay quantiles for the overall traffic [20] .
Verifiability This is where Trajectory Sampling ++ fails, and we will argue that this failure is inherent to any sampling-based solution.
The obvious problem with sampling is that a domain can lie about its performance by biasing the sampling pro-cess. Since a domain's performance is estimated based on how it treats the sampled packets, if domain X treats the sampled packets preferentially (i.e., assigns them to highpriority queues), then X's estimated performance will be higher than its actual performance.
On a first thought, such cheating seems easy to detect, as long as not all HOPs sample the same packets. We illustrate with an example. Suppose HOPs 4 and 5 from Figure 1 sample one set of packets, s 1 , whereas HOPs 3 and 6 sample a different set of packets, s 2 . Suppose domain L wants to estimate domain X's performance and collects receipts from all HOPs. First, L uses the receipts from HOPs 4 and 5 to estimate the loss and delay incurred between these two HOPs. Similarly, L uses the receipts from HOPs 3 and 6 to estimate the loss and delay incurred between them. If the two sets of statistics do not match (e.g., the estimated loss between HOPs 4 and 5 is significantly lower than the estimated loss between HOPs 3 and 6), then: either one or both of the involved interdomain links are malfunctioning, or domain X is biasing its samples to exaggerate its performance, or domain N is biasing its samples to misrepresent X's performance. Hence, one could argue, as long as not all HOPs sample the same packets (hence, not all HOPs have a reason to bias the same traffic), we can get similar incentives with the strawman, i.e., lies lead to inconsistencies, and liars are exposed to their neighbors.
The main problem with this argument is that it assumes that domain X (i.e., HOPs 4 and 5) treats the packets from set s 1 preferentially, but the packets from s 2 normally (like the rest of the traffic); yet there is a clear incentive here for domains X and N to collude and treat both sets of sampled packets preferentially, such that they make consistent claims, and the statistics computed from their receipts overestimate the performance of both of them. There are also other problems, less fundamental, but potentially significant in practice: This approach requires HOPs from different domains (in our example, HOPs 3 and 6) to agree to sample the same packets. Moreover, an "inconsistency" is now a difference in a probabilistic estimate-not a concrete disagreement about a particular packet as in the strawman.
To conclude, when each domain's performance is estimated based on how it treats sampled packets, then a sequence of interconnected domains have an incentive to collude and bias the samples taken by all of them. In contrast, when domains provide receipts for every single packet, there is no incentive for such misbehavior, because colluding with a neighbor to cover the neighbor's failures necessarily means taking the blame yourself.
An explanation of why the "Secure Sampling" technique from [12] does not address this problem can be found in Section 8.
Difference Aggregator ++
An alternative way of introducing tunability in the strawman is to aggregate, i.e., collect information not for individual packets, but for groups of packets. The benefit of aggregation versus sampling is that each domain produces information that depends on all the packets it observes, hence there is no straightforward way to cheat by treating certain packets preferentially. Hence, we next consider the following combination of the strawman and Lossy Difference Aggregator 1 [15] (we call it "Difference Aggregator ++").
Each HOP breaks the sequence of observed packets from a given path into packet aggregates, where a "packet aggregate" is a set of consecutively observed packets. For example, if a HOP observes packet sequence
2 from path P, it may break that into two aggregates {p 1 , p 2 , p 3 } and {p 4 , p 5 }. For each aggregate, the HOP computes a packet count and an average timestamp, and stores them in a receipt, together with an identifier for the aggregate. Each receipt is made available to all domains that observed the corresponding aggregate.
Moreover, each pair of HOPs from the same domain try to break the observed traffic into the same set of aggregates. A classic approach is to use common "cutting points": Each HOP applies a uniform hash function to a small, fixed portion of each observed packet. If the outcome is larger than a pre-configured threshold, then the packet is considered a "cutting point" and starts a new packet aggregate. If two HOPs use the same hash function and cutting threshold, and there is no packet re-ordering between them, then the two HOPs end up breaking the observed traffic into the same set of packet aggregates.
Computability Difference Aggregator ++ fails to meet the computability condition in two ways. First, it cannot provide meaningful statistics in the face of packet reordering. Second, even if there is no packet reordering, it cannot provide sufficient information for estimating delay quantiles-only for computing loss and estimating average delay.
Let's assume, temporarily, that there is no packet reordering within domain X. In this case, a receipt collector in possession of the (honest) receipts produced by X can compute the loss incurred by each packet aggregate α within X, by comparing the packet counts collected for α at HOPs 4 and 5. By combining such information for multiple aggregates, one can precisely compute the loss incurred by the overall traffic within X. Less obviously, by taking into account only the aggregates that did not incur any packet loss, one can estimate the average delay 1 We could have equally considered a combination of the strawman and the "Secure Sketch" technique from [12] . The conclusion would have been the same. For a comparison with that work, see Section 8. 2 In reality, a HOP would observe infinite packet sequences. In our examples, we use finite sequences for simplicity.
incurred by the overall traffic within X [15] .
On the other hand, there isn't sufficient information for computing delay quantiles for domain X, i.e., we cannot make statements of the form "90% of the packets incurred delay below 10msec within X." The only technique that we are aware of for computing delay quantiles for a domain requires knowing the delay incurred by individual packets within that domain [20] . Intuitively, this makes sense: An extreme example of a delay quantile is the maximum delay incurred by a packet aggregate within X. Unlike average delay, maximum delay cannot be computed without collecting per-packet information at the entrance and exit of X. Now let's assume that there is packet reordering within domain X. In this case, the receipt collector cannot even compute the loss and average delay incurred within X, because there is no guarantee that HOPs 4 and 5 will break observed traffic into the same aggregates.
Recap
A simple protocol (like the strawman), where each domain produces receipts for each packet it receives and delivers, provides sufficient information for computing and verifying each domain's loss/delay performance; however, the amount of resources required to store, process, and report per-packet state is (significantly) more than a typical domain can afford today. An aggregation-based protocol (like Difference Aggregator ++), where each domain produces per-aggregate receipts, introduces tunable cost, but is susceptible to packet reordering and does not provide sufficient information for estimating delay quantiles-only for computing loss and estimating average delay. Finally, a sampling-based protocol (like Trajectory Sampling ++), where each domain produces receipts for sampled packets, does provide sufficient information for estimating loss and delay quantiles and introduces tunable cost, yet is susceptible to sampling bias.
VPM Overview
VPM employs both sampling and aggregation-sampling to provide probabilistic delay-quantile measurements and aggregation to provide precise loss measurements.
VPM's sampling component shares elements with Trajectory Sampling ++ (HOPs produce receipts for a subset of observed packets and choose which packets to sample using hash functions), but prevents sampling bias in the following way. The sampling function is keyed using future traffic, making the samples unpredictable. Specifically, a domain does not know whether it will have to report measurements on a particular packet until after it has forwarded that packet to its downstream neighbor. As a result, an unscrupulous domain has no way to decide whether to "sugarcoat" its performance by preferentially treating particular packets.
VPM's aggregation component shares elements with Difference Aggregator ++ (HOPs produce receipts for packet aggregates and choose where to break each aggregate using hash functions), but provides accurate statistics in the face of packet reordering. This is achieved by providing, on top of per-aggregate receipts, extra per-packet information for a small window around the cutting points between packet aggregates.
One could ask, why use both sampling and aggregation? After all, using sampling we can estimate both loss and delay quantiles (provided we fix the sample bias issue), so why use aggregation at all? One reason is that aggregation provides precise (as opposed to probabilistic) loss measurements and, as we will see, once we have deployed the sampling component, the incremental cost of adding the aggregation component is trivial. Another reason is to add extensibility to our mechanism. Even though we do not consider this scenario in this paper, "bad" ISP behavior may consist not only of introducing loss and unpredictable delay, but also of modifying traffic; the only way to detect such behavior is to use a content-processing technique like the one proposed in [12] , which could be easily incorporated in our aggregation component, but not in a sampling-only mechanism.
Voluntary Reporting
In this section, we describe what kind of information VPM domains produce and how that information is used to estimate and verify their performance. We do not worry about how this information is generated-we defer that to the next two sections. It has form HeaderSpec, PreviousHOP , NextHOP, MaxDiff . HeaderSpec specifies which part of a packet's headers is used to identify the packet's path; it includes at least a source and destination origin-prefix pair. PreviousHOP and NextHOP specify the previous and next HOPs on this path. MaxDiff is a value agreed upon between the reporting HOP and the HOP that is at the other end of the same inter-domain link (e.g., HOPs 3 and 4 in Figure 1 ). It is meant to lower-bound the difference in timestamps one should expect between the two HOPs.
Traffic Receipts
Samples is a sequence of PktID , Time records, each corresponding to a single sampled measurement. The packet identifier PktID is a digest of the packet's headers. Time specifies when the corresponding packet was observed at the HOP. The aggregate identifier AggID consists of the packet IDs of the first and last packets of the aggregate. PktCnt is the number of packets observed by the HOP within this aggregate.
Upon receiving a packet, each HOP classifies it into a HOP path and an aggregate, counts it against that aggregate's packet count, and decides whether to sample it. Periodically, the HOP generates traffic receipts for all the sampled packets and aggregates it has observed since the last reporting time, which it disseminates to all domains that observed the corresponding traffic. Figure 1 and suppose we collect all their receipts. We now describe the types of statistics we can compute from these receipts.
Receipt-based Statistics
Suppose Receipt Combination Receipts of either kind can be combined with others from the same HOP to generate receipts of a larger sample set or coarser aggregate. For sampling receipts combination is straightforward:
For aggregate receipts, consider N consecutive aggregates, α i , i = 1..N , from the same path, and the N receipts, R αi = PathID , AggID i , PktCnt i , produced for these aggregates by a single HOP. We define the combination of these receipts as
where AggID is the identifier (first and last packet digest) of the union of all N aggregates.
Receipt Consistency Consider two receipts, R 
This rule represents the fact that a correct inter-domain link does not introduce packet loss-hence, the number of packets delivered by one HOP and received by the other should be the same.
If a receipt collector gets inconsistent receipts from two neighbors, it discards both receipts and notifies both neighbors of the inconsistency, such that the liar is exposed to the neighbor it implicated, as in the strawman ( §3.1).
(No) Clock Synchronization VPM does not require that HOPs have synchronized clocks. However, it is to a participating domain's best interest to keep its HOPs reasonably synchronized (e.g., at the granularity of a millisecond, achievable with NTP [5] ), since its delay performance will be estimated based on the timestamps reported by different HOPs. Moreover, it is to two neighboring domains' best interest to keep adjacent HOPs (like 3 and 4 in Figure 1 ) reasonably synchronized, otherwise their timestamp difference will exceed the reported MaxDiff and the two neighbors will generate inconsistent receipts (hence appear to have a problematic inter-domain link or be involved in a lie).
We should note that domains are free to report arbitrarily large MaxDiff values: nothing prevents HOPs 3 and 4 from keeping de-synchronized clocks and reporting a MaxDiff of several seconds between them. That, however, does make it look like they are connected through an awfully slow inter-domain link-not a good feature to advertise to their customers and peers.
Bias-resistant, Tunable Sampling
We now describe how each HOP chooses which packets to sample. Our sampling algorithm prevents domains from exaggerating their performance by biasing their samples ( §5.1), while it maximizes the number of packets that for all packets q in TempBuffer do 3: if SampleFcn(Digest (q), Digest (p)) > σ then 4: Add Digest (q), Time(q) to R.Samples Add Digest (p), Time(p) to R.Samples 7: else 8: Add Digest (p) to TempBuffer are commonly sampled by all HOPs that observe them, while allowing each HOP to choose its own sampling rate ( §5.2), even in the face of loss and packet reordering ( §5.3).
Bias Resistance
Instead of sampling packets in real time, each HOP maintains state on all observed packets, but only for a fixed, short period of time (ten milliseconds or so). After that period of time has elapsed, the HOP is told which of the stored per-packet state to keep and which to discard. Since an ISP learns whether a packet's fate will affect estimates of its performance only after it has forwarded that packet, it cannot treat sampled packets preferentially.
A dishonest HOP could, in theory, store every single packet, wait to learn whether the packet has to be sampled, then decide how to treat the packet. However, that means delaying all traffic at the HOP by ten milliseconds or so (an order of magnitude above the delay introduced by a correctly functional router)-not to mention that it requires buffering ten milliseconds' worth of traffic, which, for a 10Gbps interface would require 25MB (i.e., several chips) of expensive SRAM storage.
A key question is who tells each HOP which packets to delay-sample. A naïve approach would be to use explicit signaling; for example, in Figure 1 , domain S could explicitly tell all HOPs in path P which packets to sample from each aggregate sent from S to D along P. That, however, would essentially require every source domain to set up virtual circuits along all Internet paths that observe its traffic. Instead, each HOP decides whether to delay-sample a packet based on the contents of another packet sent later on the same path. In this sense, domain S implicitly dictates which of its packets should be sampled, through the traffic it subsequently routes via P anyway.
Algorithm 1 shows what happens when a HOP observes a new packet p from path P; the algorithm assumes that the HOP maintains a temporary buffer with per-packet state for all the packets observed from P. If the packet satisfies a certain condition, it is chosen as a "marker" packet (line 1). In that case, its contents determine which of the already observed packets to sample (lines 2-4) discarding the rest (line 5). The marker packet itself is also sampled (line 6). Observe that HOPs maintain state for all packets only during the short period of time until the next marker packet is observed. The marker value µ, which determines which packets are "markers," is a system-wide constant specified by VPM at design time; when there is no loss, all HOPs in P select the same packets as markers. In contrast, the sampling threshold σ, which determines which packets are sampled, is a local parameter, chosen independently at each HOP. If all HOPs in P choose the same σ, they all sample the same packets (modulo the packets that are lost). We turn next to what happens when different HOPs select different sampling thresholds.
Tunability
Each HOP chooses its own sampling rate. At the same time, given N HOPs observing the same packet sequence and their sampling rates, we maximize the number of packets that are commonly sampled by all HOPs.
The key element that enables this property is the inequality in line 3 of Algorithm 1: Consider HOPs 1 and 2, with sampling thresholds σ 1 and σ 2 < σ 1 . Suppose that p is a packet sampled by HOP 1 and q is the first marker packet observed after p by HOP 1. Since HOP 1 samples p, this necessarily means that SampleFcn(Digest (q), Digest (p)) > σ 1 > σ 2 , which means that HOP 2 also samples p; hence, HOP 2 samples at least all packets sampled by HOP 1. So, even though each HOP chooses its sampling rate independently, if there is no packet loss or reordering, different HOPs never sample partially overlapping packet sets.
Sampling Under Loss and Reordering
Loss and reordering decrease the number of commonly sampled packets. E.g., if a marker packet get lost between two HOPs, it causes them to sample arbitrarily different packet sets for several milliseconds-until the next marker arrives. The good news is that it takes unlikely amounts of (non-purposeful) loss/reordering to significantly impact the estimation accuracy of the mechanism. For instance, in Section 7, we show that, if HOPs 4 and 5 sample 1% of the observed traffic, and the link between them experiences 25% packet loss, the delay between the two HOPs can still be estimated with an accuracy of 2msec. This accuracy is sufficient for verifying today's SLAs, which typically promise intra-domain delays on the order of multiple tens of milliseconds [1] .
An under-performing domain (say X in Figure 1 ) could drop all marker packets, causing the next domain (N in our example) to sample all the wrong packets; this would ensure that X's performance is never verified according to N 's receipts. First, note that such behavior from X is detrimental to N (because it prevents it from producing correct receipts), hence N has a clear incentive to expose and stop it. Second, such behavior is bound to be exposed, because marker packets are expected to be always sampled and reported on: if X drops a marker q, it either has to admit dropping it or lie and be inconsistent with N 's claim that it never received q; either way, if X consistently drops markers, it is either globally exposed as misbehaving or locally exposed as such to N .
Tunable Aggregation
We now describe how each HOP chooses which packets to assign to the same aggregate. Like our sampling, our aggregation is "tunable," i.e., we allow each HOP to choose its own degree of aggregation, according to the locally available resources. This raises the following challenge: when HOPs aggregate differently, they produce receipts on different aggregates; how can one combine such receipts to estimate domain performance and perform consistency checking? We first describe this challenge in more detail ( §6.1), then present our solution in two parts-first assuming no loss or reordering ( §6.2), then removing this assumption ( §6.3).
Terminology and Notation:
We borrow the following terminology and notation from set theory (illustrated through the examples of Table 1): 1. A partition of a packet set S is a set of non-overlapping aggregates whose union is equal to S. Given a partition A of some packet set, each packet that is the first packet of an aggregate in A is called a cutting point. For example, p 1 and p 3 are cutting points in A = {{p 1 , p 2 }, {p 3 , p 4 }}.
2. Suppose A 1 and A 2 are partitions of the same packet set. We say that A 1 is coarser than A 2 (or A 2 is finer than A 1 ), denoted by A 1 ≥ A 2 , when each aggregate in A 1 is a union of aggregates in A 2 . More formally, we say that A 1 ≥ A 2 , when:
3. Suppose A i , i = 1..N , is a partition of packet set S. We say that J is the join of A 1 , A 2 , ...A N , denoted by J = Join(A 1 , A 2 , ...A N ), when J is the finest partition of S that is coarser than all A i . More formally, we say that
′ is also a partition of S. and some join examples. Note that not all partitions of S have a "≥" relationship, e.g., we cannot say that A2 ≥ A3 nor that A3 ≥ A2.
The Partitioning Problem
If we view all traffic sent on path P as a packet set S, then we can say that each HOP in P that performs packet aggregation computes a partition of S.
When two HOPs produce different aggregate sets from the same packet set, a domain that collects their receipts cannot directly perform consistency checking as described in Section 4. However, it can try to find traffic receipts from one HOP that, when combined, exactly correspond to traffic receipts (and aggregates) from the other HOP, and then proceed with the calculations and verification from Section 4. This corresponds to computing the join of the two aggregate sets as defined above to find the finest aggregate set over which statistics can be computed across the receipts from the two HOPs.
For instance, suppose two HOPs observe packet set S from Table 1 and, respectively, produce aggregate sets A 2 and A 3 (from the same table). A domain that collects their receipts can combine each HOP's receipts and produce the receipt that the HOP would have produced for the (single) aggregate in aggregate set A 4 . So, the two HOPs' claims can be checked for consistency only with respect to the aggregates in the coarser aggregate set Join(A 2 , A 3 ) = A 4 .
Although this approach is general-there is always a join of two aggregate sets over which a verifier can compute some combined receipts and, therefore, some performance statistics-the quality of the results varies. Intuitively, we would want the join of fine-grained aggregate sets to be just as fine-grained; otherwise information obtained and forwarded at high resource cost would end up lost in translation. In the example above, the join of A 2 and A 3 is A 4 , a single-aggregate aggregate set, even though the input aggregate sets and traffic receipts afforded multiple data points each from either HOP. In contrast, an equally "expensive" aggregate set A 
Basic Solution
At a high level, VPM limits domains' choice of packet aggregation so as to produce "good" aggregates with respect to join and combination, while allowing them to tune how fine their choice is.
Algorithm 2 shows what happens when a HOP observes a new packet p from path P; the algorithm assumes that the HOP maintains one "open" receipt per path. If the packet's contents satisfy a certain condition (line 1), then the current aggregate for path P is closed (line 2) and the packet is classified in a new aggregate (line 4); otherwise, the packet is classified in the current aggregate (line 5).
Observe that this algorithm requires constant state per aggregate and constant computation per packet (i.e., its state size and per-packet computation are not proportional to aggregate size).
Algorithm 2 ensures that HOP 2 with partition threshold δ 2 will partition a stream at least at the same points as HOP 1 with partition threshold δ 1 > δ 2 . So, even though each HOP chooses its partitioning rate independently, if there is no loss or reordering, different HOPs never produce partially overlapping aggregate sets. For instance, if HOPs 1 and 2 from Figure 1 observe packet sequence p 1 , p 
Partitioning Under Loss and Reordering
Loss can decrease the fine-ness of the join of the produced aggregate sets: Suppose HOPs 1 and 2 produce aggregate sets {{p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 }, {p 5 , p 6 , p 7 , p 8 }} and {{p 1 , p 2 }, {p 3 , p 4 }, {p 5 , p 6 }, {p 7 , p 8 }}; the join of the two sets is {{p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 }, {p 5 , p 6 , p 7 , p 8 }} (the coarsest of the two aggregate sets). However, if p 5 is lost before HOP 2, then the latter produces aggregate set {{p 1 , p 2 }, {p 3 , p 4 , p 5 , p 6 }, {p 7 , p 8 }}; now, the join of the two sets is {{p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 , p 5 , p 6 , p 7 , p 8 }} (the worst possible in this example). So, loss can cause a combination of aggregates that would otherwise have been split using the lost packet as a cutting point, which, in turn, reduces the fine-ness of the join.
The good news is that, although loss does decrease the fine-ness of the resulting join, the degradation is smooth, because the probability of coarsening the granularity of a measurement is conditioned on a cutting point being lost, not on arbitrary packet loss and, even then, not all cutting points can cause a violation of the total order when lost. For instance, in Section 7, we show that, if HOPs 4 and 5 generate an aggregate receipt for every 100, 000 packets, and the link between them experiences 25% loss, the loss between the two HOPs can still be computed for every 150, 000 packets, on average. Note that being able to compute domain loss at such granularity is more than sufficient for verifying today's SLAs, which typically promise a certain level of packet loss per month (a duration that corresponds to billions of packets, assuming a traffic rate of a few tens of Mbps along each path) [1] .
Reordering can also decrease the fine-ness of the join of the produced aggregate sets: Consider path P from Figure 1 and original packet sequenceŜ = p 1 , p 2 , ...p 8 sent along P. Suppose HOP 1 observes this sequence and partitions it into aggregate set A = {{p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 }, {p 5 , p 6 , p 7 , p 8 }}. HOP 4 observes sequence p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 5 , p 4 , p 6 , p 7 , p 8 due to reordering somewhere between the two HOPs. Even though it uses the same algorithm, it partitions the sequence into A ′ = {{p 1 , p 2 , p 3 }, {p 5 , p 4 , p 6 , p 7 , p 8 }}. The two aggregate sets are not ordered according to the "finer than" relation, so their join is the entire sequence, an undesirable effect of reordering.
In practice, packets are reordered only when they are transmitted close to one another (according to the most recent Internet-wide experiment we are aware of, packets transmitted more than half a millisecond apart were not reordered [10] ). Hence, we define, for each path P, a safety inter-arrival threshold J and assume that two packets that follow P can be reordered only if they are observed (at any HOP) less than J time units away from one another. This assumption allows us to bound the coarseness of the join at the cost of keeping extra per-aggregate state.
At a high level, we alter the mechanism of Algorithm 2 to add patch up information in every receipt. A verifier can use this patch up information to make "misaligned" receipts from different HOPs align better, thereby enabling a better join of the corresponding aggregate sets and consequently better-quality traffic statistics.
More specifically, a traffic receipt for a packet aggregate also specifies the sequence of packets observed J time units around the cutting point. In the above example, HOP 1 reports sequence p 3 , p 4 , p 5 , p 6 in its receipt for the first aggregate, and HOP 4 reports sequence p 2 , p 3 , p 5 , p 4 in its receipt for the first aggregate. In gen-eral, a receipt is extended from the earlier definition to be PathID , AggID, PktCnt, AggTrans , where AggTrans is the sequence of packet identifiers that correspond to the packets observed within a window of 2J from the aggregate's last packet.
Using this information, the verifier can transform one HOP's receipts to match what the HOP would have generated, had it observed the same packet sequence with another HOP. In our particular example, HOP 1 reports observing packet p 4 before cutting point p 5 , while HOP 4 reports observing it after the cutting point. Consequently, the verifier would transform HOP 4's receipts by "migrating" p 4 from the later to the earlier aggregate (i.e., decrementing the packet count of the former and incrementing the packet count of the latter). With this transformation, HOP 4's receipts correspond to the same aggregates with HOP 1's receipts, hence the verifier can proceed with the performance computation and verification of Section 4.
If adding per-packet state to aggregate receipts sounds like too much overhead, take into account that a HOP is supposed to choose how many packets to assign to each aggregate according to its resources. E.g., a HOP may choose to cover minutes' worth of traffic with each aggregate; in this case, including in each per-aggregate receipt per-packet state for the few packets observed around the end of the aggregate is significantly less expensive than maintaining per-packet state. We quantify this per-packet overhead in Section 7.
Evaluation
We now compute the resource overhead incurred by VPM domains, and quantify the quality with which each domain's performance is estimated.
We consider the case where HOP functionality is implemented in border routers, as part of a NetFlow-like monitoring platform that operates partly in the router's data-plane and partly in its control plane. The dataplane part handles per-packet operations and collects peraggregate state in a monitoring cache; we refer to it as the collector module. The control-plane part periodically reads the state from the data-plane and performs further processing; we refer to it as the processor module.
As a proof of concept, we implemented the collector and processor modules in Click (although, in a real router, the former would be implemented in hardware, close to the router's forwarding plane, e.g., as part of a NetFlow engine). Our implementation uses the "Bob" hash function (because it has been shown to work well with Internet traffic [19] ) to compute packet digests and applies it to each packet's IP and transport headers. The collector's monitoring cache is updated from traffic traces (as opposed to actual network traffic). We used traces from a Tier-1 ISP, provided by CAIDA.
Overhead
Memory and Processing The amount of memory and processing resources needed for the processor module is tunable. The processing module reads receipts from the monitoring cache and prepares them for storage or dissemination. The rate at which new receipts appear in the monitoring cache (hence need to be read and processed) depends directly on the locally chosen sampling and partition thresholds. Hence, a domain can directly control the amount of memory and processing cycles spent by the processing module by varying these two thresholds (a demonstration of the resulting trade-off follows).
The collector module maintains state for each "active path," i.e., each source-destination origin-prefix pair that is currently sending traffic through the specific HOP; this per-path state consists at least of one "open" aggregate receipt (a PathID , AggID , and PktCnt -roughly 20 bytes). E.g., if a HOP observes traffic from 100, 000 paths at the same time, it needs a 2MB monitoring cache.
Moreover, the collector module maintains a temporary packet buffer, where it stores PktID , Time pairs (4 and 3 bytes, respectively) for all packets observed within J time units. At first, this seems to be cause for concernwhat happens with high-rate paths that observe millions of packets per second? In reality, however, the per-packet state that needs to be kept is modest: Recall that J is our "safety threshold"-when two packets are observed more than J time units apart, we assume that they cannot be reordered. A conservative choice is to set J to 10msec-an order of magnitude above the millisecond threshold that we need according to the latest Internet reordering measurements we are aware of [10] . An OC-192 interface observes at most 10Gbps. If we assume an average packet size of 400B, 10Gbps corresponds to 3.125Mpps per direction, which means that a HOP would need a 436KB temporary buffer for each 10Gbps interface. Assuming an (implausible) worst-case traffic of all minimum-size packets, 10Gbps correspond to 20Mpps per direction, which means that a HOP would need a 2.8MB temporary buffer for each 10Gbps interface. So, even assuming worst-case traffic, the amount of buffering we need fits into a single SRAM chip.
Finally, for each packet p, the collector looks up the packet's PathID ; computes Digest (p) and a timestamp; updates the corresponding PktCnt ; and stores the digest and timestamp to the temporary packet buffer. This amounts to three memory accesses, one hash function, and one timestamp computation per packet. Moreover, whenever a marker packet is observed, the HOP goes through the temporary packet buffer and discards state for the packets that are not delay-sampled, which adds one more memory access per packet. Such processing, though not currently supported by routers, is within the capabilities of modern hardware and in line with the guidelines set by the IETF Packet Sampling group [6] .
Bandwidth We have said that each domain makes each receipt available to every other domain that observed the corresponding traffic. Whether this happens pro-actively (through a constant receipt stream) or on-demand (e.g., through a secure web interface), receipt dissemination introduces, in each path, bandwidth overhead that depends on (1) the number of HOPs on that path and (2) the rate at which each of these HOPs produces receipts.
Again, this seems, at first, to be cause for concernone could argue that introducing bandwidth overhead that grows with the total number of HOPs per path is not a "scalable" approach. In practice, this dependence on the number of HOPs is not a problem: Paths consist on average of 3-4 domains, hence 4-6 HOPs (check the "Average AS path length" and "Average address weighted AS path length" entries in [2] ). To be conservative, we consider a 10-domain path, where each HOP puts on average an ambitious 1000 packets per aggregate and samples 1% of the path's packets. Given receipt size (22 bytes), this path will incur an overhead of 0.2 bytes per packet; assuming 400 bytes per packet, this leads to a 0.046% bandwidth overhead for the path.
Click Implementation As a proof of concept, we configured an eight-core Intel Nehalem server as a standard IPv4 router and fed to it a real trace. Then we measured the router's performance with and without our VPM modules loaded and saw no difference (in both cases, the server routed 25Gbps). This is not surprising, given that, when fed realistic traffic, a Nehalem server is bottlenecked at the I/O, whereas our VPM modules burden the CPU.
Quality
Methodology We consider the case where domain X from Figure 1 is congested, and X's delay performance is estimated from its receipts. Each experiment consists of: (1) extracting a packet sequenceŜ from one of our traces and consider the case whereŜ is sent through domain X; (2) simulating a scenario where the intra-domain path between HOPs 4 and 5 is congested; (3) generating the receipts that X would generate for packet sequencê S; (4) estimating X's performance as a verifier would estimate it based on X's receipts, i.e., using the technique from [20] . (5) comparing that to X's actual performance.
For step 1, we use traces provided by CAIDA, collected in 2008 from a Tier-1 ISP. When we say that we "extract a packet sequence" from a trace, we mean that we extract all packets that carry a given source and destination originprefix pair. The point of using real traces is to verify that our sampling and aggregation algorithms work well given an actual packet stream-e.g., when a domain chooses its sampling threshold so as to sample 1% of the observed No loss 10% loss 25% loss 50% loss Figure 2 : The accuracy with which domain X's delay performance is estimated as a function of X's sampling rate, for different levels of loss, when X uses our sampling algorithm. Congestion is caused by a bursty, high-rate UDP flow. traffic, it indeed samples 1%. The results we show correspond to a particular packet sequence (of 100, 000 packets per second), but all traces and packet sequences we tried gave us consistent results.
For step 2, we "introduce" loss and delay in the chosen packet sequence. To introduce loss, we discard a subset of the packets, chosen using the Gilbert-Elliot loss model [9] . Introducing delay is more complicated, as we are not aware of any commonly acceptable delay model for Internet traffic. Instead, we use the NS simulator to create realistic congestion scenarios, and generate the sequence of delay values that our packet sequence would encounter in each case. We consider different congestion scenarios, where long-lived TCP or UDP flows compete for/saturate the bandwidth of a bottleneck link, but show results only for the scenario that introduced the highest delay variance in the shortest time scale.
Accuracy of Estimated Delay
By reducing its sampling rate, a VPM domain can reduce the amount of resources it spends sampling, at the cost of its delay performance being estimated with lower accuracy. We now examine this trade-off.
We run a set of experiments where we vary domain X's sampling rate. Figure 2 (consider the "No loss" curve) shows the accuracy with which X's delay performance is estimated, as a function of the sampling rate. We see that, reducing the sampling rate results in smooth accuracy degradation. Even if X samples only 0.1% of the observed traffic, its delay performance is estimated with sub-millisecond accuracy.
Next, we examine how packet loss affects our sampling algorithm, hence the accuracy with which a VPM domain's delay performance is estimated. We run a set of experiments where we vary both X's sampling rate and the amount of packet loss introduced by X. Figure 2 shows how accuracy degrades with lower sampling rate, for different loss values. We see that, when X samples 1% of the observed traffic and 25% of this traffic is lost Figure 3 : The granularity at which domain X's loss performance is computed as a function of the loss rate introduced by X, when X uses our aggregation algorithm.
within X, X's delay performance is still estimated with an accuracy of 2 msec. This robustness in the face of loss is partly due to our sampling algorithm and partly owed to the estimation algorithm from [20] (which works well even with few samples).
Granularity of Computed Loss
We now examine how packet loss affects the granularity at which a VPM domain's loss performance is computed.
We run a set of experiments where we fix X's aggregation rate (such that it produces one aggregate every 100, 000 packets) and vary the amount of packet loss introduced by X. Figure 2 shows the granularity at which X's loss performance can be computed, as a function of the loss rate. We see that, when there is no loss, X's loss performance can be computed over 1sec periods (because X produces a new aggregate every 100, 000 packets, which, for the particular packet sequence we are considering, corresponds to 1 sec). As the level of loss increases, granularity worsens-i.e., a verifier that collects X's receipts cannot always compute X's loss performance over 1sec periods. However, the degradation is, again, smooth: even if X loses 25% of the observed traffic, its loss performance is computable over periods of 1.5sec. This robustness in the face of loss is due to our aggregation algorithm, which maximizes the number of common aggregates across HOPs-essentially enables HOPs not to fall "out of sync" when packets get lost.
Verifiability
We have demonstrated that a VPM domain's loss and delay performance can be accurately estimated from its receipts, even when the domain samples 1% of the observed traffic, puts hundreds of thousands of packets into a single aggregate, and is severely congested (to the point of losing more than 25% of the observed traffic). The next question is, can such a domain's performance also be verified with this same quality, i.e, will the domain be caught if it lies?
The answer depends, of course, on how many resources the domain's neighbors devote to sampling and aggregation. Suppose, for instance, that domain L from Figure 1 collects receipts from X and N . Figure 2 gives some concrete numbers: If X samples at 1% and loses 25% of the observed traffic, L can estimate X's delay performance with accuracy 2msec. If N samples at the same rate, L can also verify X's performance with the same accuracy. However, if N samples at 0.1%, then L can only verify X's delay performance with accuracy 5msec.
To summarize, a VPM domain's choice of sampling and aggregation rate determines, first, with what quality its own performance can be estimated by its customers and peers; second, to what extent its receipts can be used to verify the performance of its neighbors.
Discussion and Related Work
Partial Deployment If domain X in path P has not deployed VPM, but its neighbors have, then X's neighbors are free to blame their performance problems on X (since X does not produce any receipts to refute their claims). We view this as an incentive for deployment: a domain has to report on its performance in order to prevent its neighbors from blaming their problems on it. Conversely, if X is the only domain in P that has deployed VPM, its performance reports may not be verified by its neighbors, but they are still verifiable. So, during a congestion incident, X can still position itself as the "good" ISP that provides troubleshooting information to its customers-it is not its fault that the other ISPs on the path are not up to the task. X can even use this as an incentive to encourage multi-network customers to connect all their networks through X-since that way they avoid domains that do not provide troubleshooting information.
Related Work
The Packet Obituaries protocol [3] and the fault-localization protocols from [11] inform traffic sources where individual packets get lost or corrupted. AudIt provides source domains with similar per-TCPflow information [4] . VPM is similar to these protocols in that it relies on in-path elements collecting and exporting traffic statistics; it also borrows the concept of report consistency from AudIt. VPM's novel elements are delay-sampling and tunable reporting; based on these techniques, it avoids the overheads necessary for collecting and propagating per-packet or per-flow state, while maintaining the verifiability property.
In Trajectory Sampling, routers within an ISP sample packets using a hash function and record their digests, with the purpose of inferring the internal paths (sequences of routers) followed by packets [8] . The Lossy Difference Aggregator enables two monitoring points to measure the loss and average delay between them by maintaining packet counts and average timestamps for packet aggregates [15] . We use ideas from both protocols (hashbased sampling, per-aggregate counts), but, as explained in Section 3, none of them could provide the computability and verifiability properties necessary in our context.
The "Secure Sampling" technique from [12] is useful when two entities, say Alice and Bob, want to measure the delay of the path between them by considering only a sample of the packets they exchange. To prevent intermediate nodes from treating the samples preferentially, Alice and Bob agree on which packets to sample in such a way that the intermediate nodes cannot guess which are the samples. This technique is clearly not applicable to our problem: we are not looking to hide the samples from the intermediate nodes, we are looking to force the intermediate nodes to sample honestly-in our context, the entities that perform the sampling (the domains) are precisely the ones that may bias the samples.
The "Secure Sketch" technique from [12] enables Alice and Bob to detect when the packets they exchange are lost, delayed, or modified beyond a certain level. To this end, both Alice and Bob maintain a sketch (in some sense, a summary) of all the packets they have exchanged; at the end, Alice sends her sketch to Bob, who compares the sketches and detects whether any of the above problems occurred. This technique is related to VPM in the same way with the Lossy Difference Aggregator: we could combine it with the strawman to build a mechanism that determines whether each domain modified packets beyond a certain level; however, it would not enable the estimation of delay quantiles.
Finally, VPM can be viewed as a "performance accountability mechanism," which holds domains accountable for their performance. An economic analysis has showed that such a performance accountability mechanism would foster ISP competition and innovation [16] .
Conclusions
We have presented VPM, a system by which network domains can estimate and verify each other's loss and delay performance. VPM relies on domains producing and exchanging receipts for the traffic they receive and deliver. A domain can estimate a neighbor's performance by processing the receipts produced by the neighbor; it can verify that the neighbor's receipts are honest by comparing them to the receipts produced by other domains for the same traffic. If a domain lies about its performance, that leads to receipt inconsistencies and exposes the liar to its neighbors. VPM comes at the cost of deploying (modest) new functionality at domain boundaries. The processing, memory, and bandwidth overhead incurred by a deploying domain is configurable and independently determined by the domain.
